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Abstract: The specifi c contribution of this study is to explore how a communitarian 
lifeworld prepares the ground for practices of political clientelism without requiring the 
“foundational favor” noted in other contexts. Based on the encounter between ethnog-
raphies from two different communities of the Mesoamerican tradition in Mexico, the 
article argues that this lifeworld is forged by the habitual ways in which most collective 
tasks are carried out, that is, by forming and participating in networks. First, we offer a 
concrete description of the operation of two problem-solving networks of political clien-
telism in these communities. These networks are considered legitimate since they appear 
to be part of the communitarian practices. Second, we observe that the state often fails to 
reach out to the citizens with many social benefi ts, and we maintain that the problem-
solving networks bridge the gap between the citizens and the state. Third, we argue that 
the ethnographic approach has been of paramount importance in reaching these fi ndings, 
which are hardly attainable without this method. We consider that the workings of the 
clientelist networks represent a deep expression of people’s communitarian lifeworlds.
Political clientelism has attracted considerable attention in recent years among 
scholars dedicated to the study of democracy and elections in Latin America. 
While literature from the 1960s and 1970s tended to anticipate that economic 
development and political competition would do away with it (Magaloni, Díaz-
Cayeros, and Estévez 2007, 182, 203), recent texts caution that clientelism is more 
than a remainder of authoritarian regimes (Hilgers 2012, 12). Many authors docu-
ment the considerable persistence of political clientelist practices in a number of 
different countries on the continent, while several also question the degree to 
which these practices are entirely antidemocratic (Gay 1999, 2006; Lazar 2004; 
Auyero, Lapegna, and Page 2009; Fox 2012).
The contribution of the present article is to explore clientelist practices in a 
communitarian context. We compare notes from separate ethnographic fi eldwork 
in two local communities in Mexico: Íñigo González-Fuente in Xico, Veracruz, 
and Turid Hagene in San Lorenzo Acopilco, Mexico Federal District (DF). Dur-
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ing our discussions, we were struck by the extent to which the lifeworld created 
through communitarian practices prepared the ground for the practices of politi-
cal clientelism. We notice that explorations of communitarian practices and forms 
of organizing have been absent in earlier studies of political clientelism. We offer 
insight into the importance of this issue.
We also contribute ethnographies of the workings of two problem-solving net-
works engaged in political clientelism, one in each community. Our aim is more 
descriptive than normative. However, we do have some critical refl ections on the 
fact that, in our experience and in that of many other researchers (Gay 1999, 2006; 
Lazar 2004; Auyero, Lapegna, and Page 2009; Fox 2012), some forms of political 
clientelism appear to represent a version of “poor people’s politics” (Auyero 2001). 
This is what we term “deep politics,” which seems to be in tune with the life-
worlds of many members of communities, and maybe with their interests in the 
short term.1 We further highlight the ways in which the communitarian lifeworld 
takes reciprocity for granted, and that this bestows legitimacy on the activities of 
the clientelist networks and by and large renders coercion unnecessary.
Our writing strategy is to speak in terms of “we” when we aim to produce a 
common text on our fi ndings; the ethnographies from each community, however, 
are rendered in terms of “I,” since we carried out the fi eldwork separately. Fur-
thermore, our fi ndings depend as much on the cumulative knowledge from both 
our studies as on comparison.
We do not argue that only communities experience political clientelism, but 
certainly the local societies that are communities do deploy practices, notions, 
and lifeworlds that facilitate the formation and reproduction of clientelist prob-
lem-solving networks. The goods and services obtained through these networks 
are reciprocated by votes and other electoral services, often mediated by a local 
operator, a person who enjoys considerable standing in the community, and thus 
is able to jalar gente (“pull” or mobilize people).
We appreciate that various communitarian institutions from the Mesoameri-
can tradition have survived by adaptation and negotiation through centuries of 
Spanish colonization and evangelization, liberal abolition of their right to own 
land collectively, and seventy years of authoritarian rule by the Partido Revo-
lucionario Institucional (PRI). Now the communities are adapting to the multi-
party game of democracy, where one still needs connections and support by those 
higher up in the social hierarchy in order to access public goods. The problem-
solving networks facilitate such access. Political clientelism appears to bridge the 
gap between the state and the citizens, and maybe offers as much participation as 
the top-down participative institutions offered by the Mexican state, for instance 
in the Federal District.
We are conscious that our fi ndings are not equally valid in the entire Mexican 
territory, where a variety of different clientelist practices are in operation. We 
do, however, consider that we can contribute toward fi lling part of the gap that 
1. The title “Deep Politics” refl ects our recognition of Guillermo Bonfi l Batalla’s term México profundo 
(deep Mexico).
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Auyero (2000, 74) pointed out concerning the lack of knowledge of the workings 
of problem-solving networks at the grassroots level.
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Political Clientelism and Vote Buying
Political clientelism may be defi ned as a vertical relationship that is volun-
tary, reciprocal, face-to-face or broker-mediated, and possibly affective; it plays 
out over time, involving exchange of goods and services for political support, to 
mutual benefi t (Roniger 1990, 2–4). The process takes place in networks of infor-
mal relationships that cut across social class (Adler-Lomnitz, Salazar, and Adler 
2004, 26–29).
We do not have the space for a thorough ethnographic documentation of the 
difference between political clientelism and vote buying; however, we fi nd it nec-
essary to make a brief note on the distinction between these two practices. Like 
clientelism, vote buying concerns the exchange of goods and services for political 
support, but it is limited to one specifi c exchange; thus it does not give rise to per-
sonal and affective relationships. Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2004, 66) specify 
it as payment of “minor benefi ts (food, clothing, cash) to citizens in exchange for 
their votes.” Hilgers (2011, 577–578) argues for keeping the two practices concep-
tually apart in order to aid theory building. Our fi ndings highlight the legitimacy 
of political clientelism in the communities under study, whereas vote buying is 
considered illegitimate. We would misrepresent the actual notions at work in the 
communities under study if we did not spell this out.
The visibility of this distinction depends largely on the perspective we as re-
searchers adopt. We could submit that, seen from the supply side or the perspec-
tive of the patron, these are all different ways to spend money in order to obtain 
votes (Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007, 187). The practices may approxi-
mate a continuum, with clientelist networks on one extreme and vote buying as 
a onetime monetary transaction on the other. However, seen from the demand 
side, the clients’ perspective, these practices are perceived as entirely different, 
above all when it comes to the issue of legitimacy. In our case communities, we 
noticed that the operation of political clientelism in all its stages went on visibly 
and openly, while the buying and selling of votes could never be observed, nor 
would anyone admit to having engaged in such a practice. This is not to say that 
nobody did it, but it was always spoken of as something that “others” would do, 
and something that you could accuse your adversary of, if he or she won the elec-
tion. We never heard anyone being accused of clientelist practices, but vote buy-
ing was a standard accusation.
For instance in Acopilco, after the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) 
lost the election of delegation chief in 2012, a PRD militant accused the winner, a 
previous PRD politician who had changed party to the PRI, of vote buying: “One 
week before the elections Adrián distributed a lot of water tanks and money. . . . 
How cheaply the dignity of a people is sold!” She did not accuse him of  clientelist 
P6915.indb   5 6/14/16   8:46:40 AM
6 Latin American Research Review
practices, which he was carrying out quite openly; and so was she, according 
to what she told me. While vote buying was an entirely pejorative expression, 
clientelism did not have any specifi c term in the communities; people spoke of 
“social work” or “helping each other.” The distinction between the two practices 
emerged clearly from the discourse of informants on the demand side of political 
clientelism. The issue of perspective in research on political clientelism is para-
mount, as Auyero (1999) also submits.
The only context in which informants in the communities would admit that 
they might accept resources in exchange for their votes was in speaking of receiv-
ing gifts from all possible suppliers, then voting according to their own choice. 
This was seen by many as the typically “Mexican way,” the smart and mañoso 
(trickster) way, or tranza (dishonest). For instance, a cleaning lady in Xico talked 
about the distribution of food supplies: “The government of Fox does help us,” 
she said. “Fidel Herrera also.”2 The latest food supply she had received was from 
the mayor from the party Convergencia, because she was “remotely related” to 
him. She also felt grateful to the mayor for the materials destined for a new room 
in her house. The PAN (Partido Acción Nacional) gave her an umbrella and told 
her to vote for them. She recognized that all the parties had helped her, but she 
kept voting for the PRI.
Finally, we wish to make a brief comment on the issue of force and coercion 
in the clientelist literature. Several authors have emphasized this aspect in the 
Latin American and Mediterranean context (Scott 1977; Fox 1994; Schefner 2001; 
Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 
2009; Szwarcberg 2011). Terms like “force,” “coercion,” “pressure,” “threat,” “fear,” 
and “captive” are used frequently. Following Tosoni (2007, 51), however, we wish 
to point out that the exercise of force and coercion are not inherent qualities of 
the clientelist relationship. Tosoni differentiates domination enforced by physi-
cal threats and violence from clientelist domination, which originates from ex-
changes considered legitimate by its participants. The key feature here is legiti-
macy, which will fi gure prominently in our text.
Does Clientelism Still Exist?
Literature on this phenomenon in the 1960s and 1970s perceived political cli-
entelism as “typical of underdeveloped political systems, usually at early phases 
of institutionalization, often under authoritarian or colonial regimes” (Magaloni, 
Díaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007, 182). Accordingly, some scholars (Magaloni, 
Díaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007, 203; Combes 2011, 28) predicted the disappear-
ance of political clientelism in Mexico with the advent of multiparty competition 
at the national level, following the victory of the PAN in 2000. Despite attempts to 
document such a tendency (e.g., Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2009), most 
scholars agree that it still exists (Cornelius 2004; Tosoni 2007; Hilgers 2008, 2009, 
2. Fidel Herrera was governor of the state of Veracruz (2004–2010).
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2011 and 2012; Fox and Haight 2009; González Hernández and González Hernán-
dez 2011; Hicken 2011).
Furthermore, we fi nd that it represents an important means for less privileged 
citizens to infl uence not the social programs and the principles of distribution, 
but distribution itself. What is diffi cult to obtain through bureaucratic procedures 
is attainable for the price of a vote, and other electoral services. Thus multiparty 
competition, more than doing away with political clientelism, seems to have 
brought about its democratization (Gay 2006, 212). Certainly some scholars con-
sider that clientelism undermines solidarity among peers (Foweraker 1990, 16; 
Schefner 2001, 596; Montambeault 2011, 95), whereas Lazar (2004, 228) suggests it 
may be understood as a form of citizenship practice. Fox (2012, 208), furthermore, 
argues that clientelism apparently persists; thus the question to be asked is rather 
“to what degree it interferes with citizens’ exercise of their democratic rights.”
We consider that there are three main factors that maintain and strengthen 
clientelist networks in today’s Mexico: (1) the persistence of a profound socio-
economic inequality between individuals and social groups, (2) the failure of 
public administration to reach out to the less privileged citizens, and (3) the ex-
istence of what we term a “communitarian lifeworld.” The latter refers, among 
other things, to the ways in which community members customarily seek to carry 
out many different tasks by means of forming and participating in networks. Our 
study aims to explore the two latter factors.
A Methodological Note
Our fi eldwork was carried out independently in two separate but similar proj-
ects. We used basically the same ethnographic approach, since we were both in-
terested in capturing the political process as it was seen from the perspective of 
the clients (Auyero 2002, 40). Participant observation constituted our fundamental 
activity, which Bryman (2004, 291) terms “the extended involvement of the re-
searcher in the social life of those he or she studies”; such immersion generates 
knowledge and insight (Schatz 2009, 14). Issues of moral universes, forms of ratio-
nality, legitimacy, and meanings can hardly be calculated or discovered by means 
of quantitative methods or even interviews, whereas participant observation by 
a skillful researcher makes this possible. Some of the information emerging from 
ethnographic fi eldwork is of the kind that informants take for granted and that 
“goes without saying,” which is hardly possible to obtain by any other method.
We lived in our respective communities during the fi eldwork periods. This 
facilitated personal relationships with community members and permitted ser-
endipity, an open-ended research attitude that provides access to “unsought fi nd-
ings” (Rivoal and Salazar 2013). In addition, we have relied on a multiple-methods 
approach (Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004, 270), utilizing, to varying degrees, 
informal conversations, life stories and semistructured interviews, small sound-
ings, and document analysis in archives, newspapers, and electoral statistics.
In Xico the fi eldwork period lasted for ten months, from October 2005 to July 
2006, thus including the campaign for the presidential election in July 2006. I used 
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to hang out with the “esquineros,” neighbors, mostly men, who spent hours on end 
at the corner next to the house where I was living. It was precisely through an 
esquinera that I found Luisa’s restaurant and learned about her problem-solving 
network. After a few weeks I had my neighbor network, which constantly kept 
me informed about who the representatives of the parties were, where the meet-
ings and the distribution of food supplies took place, and when the candidates 
were coming to hold their rallies. From then on I entered into deep immersion in 
the municipal center of Xico; I could frequent the meetings of various parties on 
a regular basis and interview key actors in local politics. All this allowed me to 
register the main clientelist networks used by the political parties in the munici-
pal elections of 2005.
In Acopilco the fi eldwork periods amounted to fi fteen months over the years 
2003–2012, which included three periods of electoral activity (2003, 2006, and 
2012). I noticed that socioreligious practices mobilized large numbers of villagers 
on a continuous and highly visible scale. I started participating in these activities, 
which also made me a well-known fi gure among large numbers of villagers. I also 
took long morning walks, a pleasant way to get acquainted with other morning 
walkers, have informal conversations, get updates on the latest gossip, observe 
a variety of housing conditions, spot calls for meetings at the village zócalo (cen-
tral square), experience the mass of stray dogs, witness the numerous religious 
shrines (ermitas), and see women queuing for water in the dry season.
My repeated stays made it possible to piece together fragments of information 
registered on different occasions concerning the problem-solving clientelist net-
work described in this text. The fact that I had met the operator Juan in 2005, when 
he was campaigning for the commissariat in charge of the communal property, 
made me strike up a conversation with him when I saw him outside the polling 
station in the 2006 election; that was how I noticed his monitoring. Later, I was 
able to be present at the initiation of the new electoral cycle of the network in 2011 
and fi nally attended its enjoyable carnitas party, with its monitoring function, on 
Election Day in 2012.
DESCRIPTION OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES
Xico, Veracruz
Xico is a semiurban municipality located on the skirts of Cofre del Perote (an 
extinct volcano), forming part of Coatepec, an important coffee-growing valley, 
twenty kilometers southeast of Xalapa, the capital of the state of Veracruz. The 
municipality occupies a surface of 179 square kilometers and consists of seventy-
four localities, with a population of 35,188 (INEGI 2011). The town council is lo-
cated in the municipal center of Xico and consists of a mayor, a trustee, and three 
aldermen.
The territory could be divided into three parts, according to geological char-
acteristics, forms of land property, and predominant economic sector. The lower 
part contains the municipal center, where I carried out most of my ethnographic 
fi eldwork, and several settlements of fi ve hundred inhabitants or more, constitut-
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ing 80 percent of the population. The intermediate part contains 12 percent of the 
population, distributed among innumerable separate communities. The upper 
part concentrates the so-called “nuevos pueblos” (new villages), a product of the 
Agrarian Reform in the 1930s and 1940s. Those who live here are members of the 
ejidos (common property).
The local socioeconomic structure is dominated by patrons who are primarily 
large cattle owners, self-denominated as “gente de razón” (rational people). This is 
an upper-class segment consisting of twelve families who own large coffee plan-
tations or grazing land for cattle. They live on the main street in the municipal 
center and do not participate in the communitarian socioreligious organization, 
which here is called mayordomía. Furthermore, there is a group of middlemen, 
consisting of small and midsized proprietors, as well as people employed in 
formal jobs: professionals, public servants, and teachers. Most of these middle-
men live close to the main street, just like the house where I lived. The everyday 
and familiar interaction between these groups hides an unregulated and asym-
metric relationship of production that is deeply vertical (see Dehouve 2009, 21). 
There is no contractual interchange; rather, the predominant view is to consider 
the relationship as paternalism, in the form of the patron giving work to the less 
privileged.
The large majority of the population in Xico belongs to the lower socioeco-
nomic stratum. They have informal jobs, “renting themselves out to work,” or 
they “help” the middlemen and patrons in agriculture, construction, and com-
merce. They live in the upper parts of the municipal center, above the church, 
on the outskirts of the center, or in rural communities in small houses of stone 
and wood, which they obtain through different government programs. These less 
privileged neighbors participate, often together with the intermediaries, in dif-
ferent communitarian practices such as celebrations that belong to the Catholic 
ritual calendar, for instance, processions or manufacturing of the fl oral arches.
Acopilco, Distrito Federal
Acopilco is a semirural pueblo originario (village with Mesoamerican roots) 
situated in the Federal District, Delegation of Cuajimalpa, bordering on the state 
of Mexico. Acopilco owns communal property of 16.08 square kilometers, which 
together with 1.27 square kilometers of small private property constitutes its en-
tire territory; 14 square kilometers of the communal property (bienes comunales) 
is forest, and the population of twenty-four thousand (INEGI 2010) lives on the 
remaining area.
The municipalities in the Federal District were suppressed in 1929 (Serrano 
2001), and no local fi gure is elected in the constitutional elections at the village 
level. However, from 1997 the population has participated in elections of a gov-
ernment chief in the Federal District, a member of the local Legislative Assembly 
(ALDF), and, from 2000, a delegation chief for Cuajimalpa.
Acopilco is one of two hundred pueblos originarios in the Federal District (Co-
rrea 2010); these feature a series of social, religious, political, and cultural practices 
that distinguish them from the rest of the city. These villages have  communitarian 
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organizations, a civic-religious cargo system, a Catholic festive calendar including 
the celebration of the patron saint (fi esta patronal), defense of their territory and 
natural resources, a communitarian cemetery, collective memory, and networks 
of symbolic interchange (mandas) with other communities (Hagene 2007; Medina 
2009; Romero 2009).
The original families and their descendants call themselves “natives,” whereas 
those who have in-migrated more recently from other states and from downtown 
Mexico City are called avecindados. For the most part, only the natives participate 
in the communitarian practices, and the 2,345 comuneros—people with agrarian 
rights according to the offi cial agrarian census—are all natives. The comuneros 
have their own commissariat to oversee the communal property; members are 
elected every three years in an assembly. The election itself, however, is carried 
out using ballot boxes similar to those used in the constitutional elections.
Nowadays only about one hundred people have income from primary activi-
ties, and fewer than one-third, mostly construction workers, have income from 
the secondary sector. Over two-thirds work in the tertiary sector, in commerce, 
transport, education, different kinds of services (professional, government, and 
domestic), and restaurants (SIDESO 2003). More than half the population have an 
income of less than twice the minimum wage, while fewer than half earn incomes 
equivalent to between two and nine times the minimum wage; 3 percent have an 
income of more than ten times the minimum wage. The majority of the popula-
tion is among the poorer segments, but the social hierarchy is not as visible as in 
Xico, since the lower segments generally do not work for wealthy or landown-
ing families in the community. Most people work outside the village, frequently 
downtown.
The population has been growing fast in the last decades, as is the case for most 
peripheral areas of the Federal District (Aguilar 2008). In only the past twelve 
years the number of registered voters has grown from ten thousand to seventeen 
thousand, mostly due to in-migration (IEDF 2000, 2012).
Forging a Communitarian Lifeworld
We present two local societies that fi rst and foremost have in common that 
their members share a communitarian lifeworld. The lifeworld is the domain 
of everyday social existence and practical activity, understood as that which we 
take for granted and which possesses the naturalness of “things as they are” 
(Hagene 2010, 219). One aspect of the community lifeworld, of particular inter-
est in this study, is the way in which the community’s tasks are solved by means 
of networks. People participate throughout their lives in networks dedicated to 
religious organization (fi scalías/mayordomías), assemblies, collective work ( faena), 
fi ctive family relations (compadrazgo), agrarian organizations (bienes comunales/
ejido), or socioreligious practices embedded in the Catholic festive cycle.3 In the 
following we render one example from each community in the socioreligious 
3. Fiscalías and mayordomías are communitarian religious institutions dating from colonial times in 
Mexico, the fi rst in charge of the church, the second responsible for specifi c celebrations.
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sphere: the Catholic celebration of San José in March 2006 in Xico, and the main 
patron saint festival in March 2005 in Acopilco. Every celebration features its own 
selection and combination of ritual elements, which serve to reproduce the com-
munitarian identity and lifeworld.
The fi esta of San José includes processions, communitarian meals, and manu-
facturing of a fl oral arch. The latter is a characteristic ingredient of the most out-
standing celebrations in the municipal center of Xico. A fabricated wooden arch, 
to which fl owers are fi xed, surrounds the entrance to the church. We include this 
practice to show the way in which the communitarian work is done: the orga-
nization of social and religious activities associated with the elaboration of the 
arch is carried out by using networks. Specifi cally, the mayordomo, elected every 
three years by the members of the community, is responsible for organizing all 
activities around the manufacturing of the fl oral arch. Many times throughout 
the year, a large number of the mayordomo’s relatives and friends participate col-
lectively in the “fetching of the lianas” that serve to fi x the fl owers to the wooden 
structure, the “gathering of the fl owers,” and the “hoisting of the arch.” The tasks 
are assigned according to gender: the men carry out the rough work and coordi-
nate the activities, while the women are in charge of the cooking, adornments, 
cleaning, and so on.
The fi esta’s highlight is March 19, the day of San José. Fifty or more men carry 
the arch in a procession to the church and take turns in hoisting the arch to 
frame the church entrance; meanwhile, the women prepare the communitarian 
meal that is offered afterward. Both the procession and the meal are accompanied 
by music played by a brass band, dances, and rockets. The networks created by 
manufacturing the arch and associated activities constitute the base for the main-
tenance and strengthening of other types of networks, including those of political 
clientelism. This is what the person in charge of the manufacturing in 2006 told 
me: “The arch fi rst and foremost unifi es people; you share with new people, make 
friends, and strengthen the relationships you already have.” Moreover, I have ob-
served many times how the people who “pull” people (jalar gente) to go and fetch 
the fl owers in the woods can also “pull” people in order to support a candidate.
In Acopilco, the two patron saint festivals (in March and August) require con-
tinuous labor to collect resources and to purchase or rent, produce and prepare, 
and organize and realize the various elements necessary for the celebrations. 
The main fi esta is organized by the fi scales in collaboration with the Grupo Pro-
Fiesta.4 It celebrates El Padre Jesús and takes place in March, starting on a Friday, 
with a seven-hour-long procession that meanders through the entire territory of 
the village. The participants carry sugarcane, freshly cut by networks of families 
who travel several hours and work the whole day cutting and loading the cane 
onto their trucks. Every year the same families are in charge of fetching the cane, 
though new participants may join.
At the end of the open-air mass on Sunday, the three couples of fi scales invite 
the entire community present to eat at their houses, normally in a patio, terrace, 
4. Grupo Pro-Fiesta is a union of what used to be ten different groups and networks in charge of 
diverse aspects of the fi esta.
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or garden. Each couple is prepared to feed some two to three hundred people 
with mole or carnitas, the traditional ritual food, accompanied by soda, beer, and 
tequila. This element in the ritual repertoire is replicated by political operators of 
clientelist networks. It is a prestigious task to be a fi scal, and if the collected funds 
are not suffi cient, some couples might end up taking out loans to cover these costs. 
Communion and reciprocity are realized on this ritual occasion.
In both communities all the expenses of the church and chapels and the cel-
ebrations of the ceremonial cycle are covered by the weekly collection of contri-
butions from the villagers. For the church, the fi scales in Acopilco and the ma-
yordomos in Xico do this job, and for the other celebrations, various committees 
carry them out. The villagers take turns to be in charge of these tasks, normally 
for one year at a time. Thus reciprocity consists in taking turns and contributing 
economically, while the practice forges networks adapted to the task and the ter-
ritory it covers. Since this is the form of carrying out most of the communitarian 
tasks mentioned above, most villagers experience relationships with a number of 
other villagers, and over time, in different roles.
Many of these ceremonial activities generate a ritual language (Romero 2009, 
59; see also Dehouve 2009), internalized by the community members. Many of 
these elements are used in family celebrations and, what is more interesting, these 
elements are activated also in practices of political clientelism. In comparison, 
Szwarcberg (2012, 234) emphasizes the way in which nonpolitical social networks 
subsequently serve in the context of political clientelism. Her case, however, is not 
that of a community with Mesoamerican roots but concerns a poor neighborhood 
in Buenos Aires, where potential brokers build a following by offering favors like 
babysitting, money lending, and counseling.
In both communities under study here, the procedure is the same in whatever 
activity there is to carry out, be it to mobilize people to construct and decorate an 
altar, pick coffee, attend political meetings, or vote: one operator passes the word 
and his or her people show up. This way of operating through networks is not 
simply an organizational pyramid, as we see it, but a deep expression of the com-
munitarian lifeworld manifested through the ritual language.
WORKINGS OF THE CLIENTELIST NETWORKS
Political Clientelism in Xico, 2006
In 2006, when Felipe Calderón fi nally won the presidential elections, in Xico 
politics was centered on the recent municipal elections of 2005 and the position-
ing of the various groups regarding the “assault” on the municipal presidency 
in 2007. So even though my research took place during the electoral campaign 
for the presidential elections on July 2, 2006, the major part of my ethnographic 
material concerns past and future municipal elections, which were considered 
most contested in the population under study. Against this background I describe 
the functioning of one clientelist network that participated in the municipal cam-
paign in 2005. I emphasize particularly how the network shares some signifi cant 
features of the communitarian lifeworld: it is oriented to long-term relationships 
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(including intense periods during election times), to coexist with other social and 
religious networks, and to allow individuals to claim access to a variety of differ-
ent resources (Adler-Lomnitz 1994, 76–77; Portes 1998, 3).
A Problem-Solving Network of Women
The network stands out because it consists mostly of women from the lower 
socioeconomic stratum. Among all the women, Luisa is the broker, the person in 
charge of motivating people (jalar gente) to participate in the network. On this oc-
casion the network is promoting the Partido Revolucionario Veracruzano (PRV), 
although at other times Luisa collaborates with other parties or candidates.
I met Luisa the day that Victoria, a neighbor with whom I shared the corner 
next to my house, invited me to eat at Luisa’s restaurant. (Luisa combined the 
running of the restaurant with her job as a teacher in Xico.) Victoria was a remote 
relative of Luisa’s, and she insisted I had to meet her, since she had been regidora 
(alderman) in the municipality of Xico until a few weeks earlier. On this occasion 
Luisa could not attend to us because she had urgent business in the nearby mu-
nicipality of Coatepec; she was helping a lady to resolve some transactions with 
the notary concerning an inheritance.
The next day, Luisa explained how yesterday’s occurrence was an everyday ac-
tivity for her. She told me that she does everything possible to help people resolve 
issues with the local administration (applications for public benefi ts, documents 
concerning inheritance, etc.). When she gets money from a candidate in an elec-
tion campaign, she obtains all kinds of gifts for those who need them, and her 
husband sometimes calls her the “local charity.” For years she has worked like 
this, with the result that a network of middle-aged women has formed around 
her, looking for help with their dealings with the bureaucracy and trusting her 
advice at the moment of casting their votes.
Luisa belongs to a series of organizations connected with the PRI; she defi nes 
herself as a woman who is sought out by the candidates because she “pulls peo-
ple.” When the candidates “invite you, they offer you positions,” she tells me. 
During election times, she carries out “auténticas campañas de altura” (authentic 
high-quality campaigns): she walks the village house by house, including those 
of the opposition, telling people about the program of the candidate she supports, 
and many people follow her. With the money she gets from the candidates, Luisa 
offers medicine, food supplies, and clothes to the neighbors.
Luisa explains to me how the distribution of gifts among the neighbors takes 
place: a number of people are selected from the electoral register who are consid-
ered hard-core PRI-followers (priístas de hueso colorado), and they are the ones who 
are encouraged with gifts so that they will be motivated to mobilize and convince 
their families and friends.
Luisa’s network became especially important in 2005 after the PRI split into 
two parties, the PRI and the PRV. The fi rst was dominated by the “teachers’ 
group” and the second by a group of large landowners. The PRV was created by 
the PRI in Veracruz expressly in order to keep control of all the groups that could 
not be accommodated in the PRI lists. Then, once the elections were over, there 
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would be governing pacts between the two parties in order to obtain an absolute 
majority and govern together. As an example, in the municipal elections of 2005 
Luisa was invited to run for offi ce with David of the Convergencia Party, but she 
excused herself, saying “I am priísta.” Also the PRI group of teachers invited her, 
but fi nally she was included in the list of candidates for regidores (aldermen) of 
the PRV due to her “friendship” with the candidate Marcos, and because the PRV 
promised a job for her son in the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE). From her 
point of view, politics is “business,” and people like her “participate in order to 
get some economic benefi t.”
The fi nancing of Marcos’s candidacy was taken care of by one of the richest 
families in Xico. For many years this family had unsuccessfully tried to win the 
municipal presidency. On this occasion, they chose to support Marcos as can-
didate, since he was popular among the neighbors. During the 2005 campaign, 
Luisa commented that her group invited the entire population equally: “We went 
to all the houses, including the remote settlements, and those of the opposition; 
I don’t look at acronyms”, said Luisa, “We gave live animals, goats and chickens, 
and we slaughtered a pig” to share between the neighbors at a party (convivio).
Luisa’s network is a structure in which asymmetrical relationships are consoli-
dated on the basis of the different amounts and types of the resources that can be 
attained in the exchange (Adler-Lomnitz 1994, 102; Portes 1998, 4). Luisa aspires 
to acquire stable employment for her son; at the same time, the women in her net-
work gain access to small rewards both during the campaign and afterward. In 
addition, they understand that when she joins the Xico government team, Luisa 
will help them obtain access to public programs of social help faster.
In fact, Luisa obtained the position of third alderman for the PRV in the mu-
nicipal elections in 2005, although after a few months her fellow party members 
forced her out because she refused their order to give half her alderman’s salary 
to the municipal president Marcos. Although she denounced the “theft” of her 
position, Luisa would feel content if “they give a job to my son in exchange for the 
aldermanship.”
Of course, Luisa resented losing her position, because “the women who follow” 
her have a lot of trust in her: “You will help us, Luisa; you will build our houses,” 
referring to the facility with which they would access the municipal programs of 
construction or improvement of houses if Luisa stayed on in the municipal gov-
ernment team. As Auyero (1999, 309) suggests, these exchanges are not explicitly 
negotiated, but they are “part of the stock of practical knowledge.” At any rate, 
these women encouraged her to keep fi ghting for her aldermanship, arguing that 
“they should give you something.” The women considered legitimate both Luisa’s 
claim and their own preferential access to social programs in exchange for giving 
support to a candidate. Finally, Luisa believed that it was perfectly legitimate to 
claim a job for her son in exchange for her time in the party. To this effect she wrote 
a letter directly to the governor, Fidel Herrera, asking him to “do her the favor of 
fi nding a good job for her son, after all these years of work in favor of the party.”
Luisa’s network is a network of political clientelism. Once Luisa receives fi -
nancing from a candidate, it is put in motion with great intensity, agility, and 
determination among people who are previously united by a problem-solving 
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network and social practices such as participating in the same convivios. Luisa is 
a problem solver throughout the year, and she knows perfectly well how to capi-
talize on her network at election time.
From our perspective, the network’s particular way of functioning has to do 
with what we have termed a communitarian lifeworld. Luisa and the women, as 
members of the same community, share the habit of constructing and maintaining 
lasting relationships that are formed around activities pertaining to the Catholic 
festive calendar. They share it because, as Portes (1998, 3) suggests, the individu-
als utilize the networks as a reliable source of benefi ts. In the Mexican context of 
socioeconomic inequality, Luisa and the women adapt their habits of reciprocal 
exchanges of resources to the political calendar, which possesses its own rituals 
in the form of campaigns and electoral appointments. In other words, their com-
munitarian lifeworld articulates in a specifi c way with clientelistic practices, gen-
erating a structure that legitimizes the asymmetrical distribution of resources.
Political Clientelism in Acopilco, 2006
Over the years I have observed a series of practices in and around Acopilco 
which, taken together, present an outline of a social system where clientelism 
is taken for granted and perceived as legitimate among the clients, similar to 
what Auyero (2000, 75) observed in Argentina. In this subsection I explore a 
 neighborhood-based problem-solving network from the end of one electoral cycle 
in July 2006, through the beginning of a new cycle in 2011, to its end on Election 
Day in 2012. It is deeply embedded in the actors’ communitarian practices and 
lifeworlds, which seems to be what legitimizes the clientelist practices.
A Problem-Solving Network of Neighbors
On Election Day, July 2, 2006, I visited a series of polling stations in Acopilco. 
Outside one of them I struck up a conversation with a villager who was checking 
off people on a list. He told me that he had mobilized 130 votes, so he wanted to 
see if they actually turned up to vote. While we were talking, an elderly woman 
came out from the polling station; she spoke with him, he checked her name and 
asked how she had voted, upon which she told him, “Todo amarillo!” (all yellow), 
yellow being the color of the PRD. He did not seem in the least embarrassed to be 
“caught red-handed” monitoring people’s votes. He volunteered that nobody had 
offered him a job in return for his electoral work, implying that this would have 
been normal. There was no need, he said, since he did this “out of passion.” He told 
me that he helped people with paperwork and dealings with the authorities, and 
instead of asking for money, he asked them to vote for the PRD. I also observed 
people from other parties checking names off their lists; apparently this kind of 
mobilization and monitoring is seen as legitimate and does not require conceal-
ment or pretense. Voting for a certain party constitutes reciprocation for a received 
benefi t; it obeys the communitarian norm of reciprocation, hence the legitimacy.
During a fi eld visit in Acopilco in February–March 2011, I had the opportunity 
to observe how vote mobilizing may be initiated, drawing on the local experi-
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ence of communitarian networks for collective work (faena), family celebrations 
( compadrazgo), celebrations of the Catholic ceremonial cycle with its different 
ritual elements, and so on. The villager mentioned above, let us call him Juan, had 
a handmade poster on his door inviting his neighbors to meet in the Comité de la 
Esperanza (Committee of Hope). Some twenty-fi ve people turned up. Juan’s wel-
come speech drew heavily on the ritual formality employed by fi scales on solemn 
occasions. He reminded his neighbors of what they had achieved in earlier years 
and suggested that they invite Adrián (the upcoming PRD candidate for delegation 
chief) to the next meeting to get a complete overview of the existing welfare pro-
grams; he would help them obtain the benefi ts to which they might be entitled.
Apparently this was the fi rst in a series of meetings that led to his neighbors 
getting microcredits, food assistance, cheaper milk, housing credits, health insur-
ance, and unemployment insurance, well in advance of the next election of dele-
gation chief in July 2012. The welfare programs were mostly managed by different 
offi cers at the delegation headquarters, but Juan pointed out that people would 
meet with diffi culties if they approached them on their own. So he volunteered to 
mediate, fi nding out what documents were needed, receiving them, and passing 
them on to the PRD candidate, Adrián. “Adrián will support us, and we will sup-
port him,” Juan explained.
Furthermore, he outlined plans for parties on upcoming important dates, for 
instance Mother’s Day in May, when they would ask the candidate to help out with 
some tacos. He also suggested other possibilities for fi nancing a party. In this way 
they would revive and expand previous problem-solving and social networks 
where enjoyment was part of the social glue (see for instance de Vries 2002, 912). 
Adrián, the candidate, would help them obtain their benefi ts, and in return they 
would support him in the 2012 elections. In addition they would socialize and 
have a good time, along the lines of other communitarian ritual celebrations.
Three weeks after this meeting I talked with one of the persons who had been 
there, and learned that the candidate had indeed arrived, informed them of the 
possibilities, and told them what documents they needed for each benefi t. Juan 
had received the documentation from his neighbors and passed it on to the candi-
date, who would be interested in speeding up the handling process and securing 
a positive outcome. During the fi rst meeting, Juan pointed out that it also would 
be better to use this help to obtain medical assistance, because the government 
institution “makes it diffi cult for us” (nos pone trabas).
Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2009, 230) argue that the federal welfare 
programs could not be used to create clientelist relationships because benefi ts 
should be distributed according to objective poverty criteria, but the present ex-
ample shows that although criteria might very well be objective, people needed 
help from politicians to obtain the benefi ts even if they met the criteria. Acopilco 
is located only a fi fteen-minute bus ride from the administrative center of the 
delegation; without the mediation of brokers, populations in most rural localities 
would meet with even more diffi culties when trying to obtain welfare benefi ts to 
which they are entitled.
There was a widespread idea in Acopilco that the community ought to get 
something in return for their votes. The community’s commissioner organized 
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parties for the comuneros with the candidate from the PRD in 2006, giving him 
a chance to win votes. An ex-commissioner told me that this time they would 
demand more in return for their votes. Again we perceive that reciprocity forms 
part of the lifeworld of these villagers. When I was back in the village in Decem-
ber 2006, several of the local PRD militants and organizers were now employed 
in the delegation. There is no reason to believe that this phenomenon is restricted 
to Acopilco. For example Roniger (2004, 354), building on studies from a series 
of European and Latin American countries, argues that “clientelism . . . leads to 
over-employment and under-qualifi ed personnel in public administration.” In 
communities of the Mesoamerican tradition, like Xico and Acopilco, political cli-
entelism of this type enjoys a high degree of legitimacy; it approximates yet an-
other expression of communitarian institutions. As Medina and Stokes (2007, 69) 
remark, when clientelism is operating, clients are often better off under a patron, 
although clientelism as such is not necessarily a system to their advantage.
Political Clientelism in Acopilco, 2012
Ten days before the 2012 elections I returned to Acopilco to do fi eldwork. On 
my morning walk I saw the well-known face of Adrián on an election poster, but 
the name of the party on the poster was not PRD but PRI/Verde! Why was he a 
PRI candidate, when he used to be a PRD candidate? I had heard about a similar 
case in the election of delegation chief in 2000; on that occasion the change was 
from the PRD to the PAN. I was curious to fi nd out what had happened, so I found 
Juan, the intermediary, and obtained an interview with him; the local PRI cell was 
also represented.
Juan explained that he had worked with Adrián over several years, within the 
PRD structure, but a few months before the elections the PRD appointed another 
candidate for delegation chief. Adrián would still be a candidate, but now for 
PRI/Verde, in return for supporting PRI candidates at the higher levels. Juan told 
me that the people whom Adrián had helped still understood that they were to 
vote for him, so from March on the intermediaries were busy explaining that now 
they were to vote for the PRI, not for the PRD.
Juan, who was in direct communication with the clients, had the impression 
that the majority would vote for Adrián. But there were many more intermediar-
ies in the delegation, and I heard different estimates as to how many would follow 
Adrián over to the PRI. They were confronted by the dilemma between party loy-
alty (for some), principles, and invested clientelist work, which might yield fruits 
in the form of jobs if Adrián won, supposing they followed him. Otherwise this 
work would be wasted. Both economic and moral rationalities, the latter based on 
reciprocity, were at play in these dilemmas. Meanwhile Juan rejoiced that Adrián 
was on top in the surveys; this was very important, since “people go with the one 
who is on top” (la gente se va con el que está arriba); Lazar (2004, 231) reports the 
same observation from Bolivia.
On Election Day, July 1, in the morning, I observed people queuing up to vote. 
At about 2:30 p.m. I entered the patio of Juan, who had invited me for carnitas, the 
most accessible form of ritual food in Acopilco. Juan told me later that 664 adults 
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from different parts of Acopilco came to “have a taco” in his patio; this was a 
considerably greater number than those who participated in his problem-solving 
network. He pointed out that the costs, about twenty-four thousand pesos, were 
covered by him and two PRI militants, all of them drawing on contributions from 
their local people.
Earlier on, he explained, he and his group had divided the list of people in 
his area between them, making house-to-house visits (canvassing), asking people 
for whom they planned to vote. He thought this had also contributed to remind 
the members of the network to actually turn up and vote, so they could show the 
voter ink on their fi ngers when they joined the carnitas party. This party (con-
vivio) was much the same as the ritual meal offered by the fi scales during the 
fi esta, with the exception of the invitation being passed on privately, not in an as-
sembly, as the fi scales do. It is, of course, not allowed to invite voters to free meals 
on Election Day, hence the relative secrecy. But Juan commented to me that they 
might put up a banner saying “Happy Birthday” to circumvent the regulation. 
He fi nished the story of the taco party by pointing out the importance of “being 
affectionate and charismatic with them” (el afecto, el carisma que uno tiene con ellos). 
Like the ticking off on the list of mobilized voters in 2006, there was an aspect of 
monitoring to Juan’s carnitas party, checking out the electoral ink blotch on the 
fi ngers of the guests; but this occasion was friendlier and more trusting and had 
no sense of threat or coercion. As Nichter (2008, 19) states, it is also worthwhile to 
monitor the turnout of mobilized voters.
When the electoral results were ready, Juan reported that Adrián had won 
the delegation for the PRI, as the party’s only delegation chief in the Federal 
District. Acopilco had been crucial for Adrián’s victory; of the 1,145-vote advan-
tage he obtained over the PRD candidate, 1,125 came from Acopilco (IEDF 2012). 
 Reciprocity-based rationality prevailed; by the end of the year, Juan was hired in 
the delegation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The two local societies that we have studied feature strong communitarian 
institutions and practices, which imply frequent interaction and long-term rela-
tionships among their members, generating multiple networks of reciprocity, a 
ritual language, and a communitarian lifeworld. One important contribution of 
our study is the concrete description of the operation of two networks of political 
clientelism in these communities: a problem-solving network of women in Xico 
and a network of neighbors in Acopilco. There are differences between these net-
works, but they both draw on the participants’ experiences regarding the way 
in which most collective tasks are carried out: forming and participating in net-
works. In these communities, to activate networks and rely on reciprocity is part 
of their lifeworld, or “their habitual knowledge,” as Auyero (2000, 72) terms it.
In Auyero’s study (2000, 67), networks must be initiated by a “founding favor” 
from a broker or patron, while Szwarcberg (2012, 232–234) describes babysitting, 
money lending, or counseling as a way to found a clientelist network. Their stud-
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ies have been carried out in localities, which are not communities. Our main con-
tribution is to document a habit of creating and taking part in networks. In the 
communities studied, networks of political clientelism do not require a founda-
tional favor, since networking is the obvious way to carry out all sorts of tasks.
Another contribution of our article is to demonstrate the importance of study-
ing communitarian forms of organizing (when applicable) as part of the study of 
political clientelism. This fi nding gives a new perspective on the issues of reci-
procity and legitimacy. In the communitarian context these are both generated 
by the specifi c practices of the communities, granting legitimacy to the reciprocal 
practices of the clientelist problem-solving networks.
Consequently, in the communities under study there is little need for force, 
threats, or coercion in order to secure the clients’ electoral reciprocation. The ex-
changes are considered legitimate, since they are embedded in the communitar-
ian lifeworld of reciprocity. Even monitoring, which some scholars (Szwarcberg 
2011, 19; Alvarez-Rivadulla 2012, 32–34) see as an integral part of clientelism, has 
a friendly version in the context of our case communities, as we observe in Juan’s 
taco party on Election Day. Auyero (2000, 73–74), Alvarez-Rivadulla (2012, 25), and 
Schefner (2001, 620) express the view that the legitimacy of brokers (and patrons) 
rests heavily on their capacity to deliver the goods. In our context we fi nd that le-
gitimacy is intimately linked to norms of reciprocity. To deliver the goods, what-
ever they are, is simply the patron/broker’s part of the bargain. In noncommu-
nitarian contexts, lifeworlds of reciprocity are likely to be weaker; therefore the 
degree of legitimacy among the clients and the use of force, threats, and coercion 
against them may vary greatly from what we found in our cases. This indicates 
that it is important in any study of political clientelism to specify whether the 
locality under study is a community.
Furthermore, we have added to the knowledge concerning the role of problem-
solving clientelist networks in the interface between the citizens and the state: 
to bridge the gap. In both the state of Veracruz and the Federal District, there 
are public programs providing social and economic benefi ts to citizens. However, 
the state does not manage to extend these to the citizens; citizens must rely on 
the mediation of brokers and patrons in order to actually obtain these benefi ts, 
even when they are entitled to them. Hilgers (2011, 570), referring to the tendency 
among many social scientists to see clientelism as a traditional relationship that 
would disappear “as society modernized and professionalized state agencies be-
gan to redistribute resources and ensure security based on impersonal regula-
tions,” states that it was thus “contrary to all expectations that central adminis-
trative structures . . . connected with traditional sectors . . . through an interface 
mirroring clientelism.” Like Hilgers, we have found that local middle-class peo-
ple have taken to trading their expertise in the rules of the external world. This 
would constitute a fair summing up of the modus operandi of the brokers Luisa 
and Juan and the patron Adrián.
Moreover, in combination with the generalized multiparty competition in Mex-
ican elections in recent decades, bridging the gap between citizens and the state 
also feeds into expressions like “the democratization of clientelism” (Gay 2006, 
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212; Hilgers 2012, 16) and to considering political clientelism as part of a citizen-
ship practice (Lazar 2004, 228). We maintain that political clientelism carried out 
in contexts like those we have described permit a view of the practice that is quite 
different from that of the captive client, subject to coercion and force, with no 
other option than to sell her vote, although such cases probably also exist.
Although our primary concern has been descriptive, our fi ndings seem to sup-
port a more nuanced picture of political clientelism, instead of one fi xed norm for 
every imaginable case, which appears to be the ideal of Hicken (2011, 300–302). 
We take his text to imply that any serious study of political clientelism should 
contribute to a grand theory of clientelism, equally valid in all places and at all 
times. We agree that the use and generation of theory are necessary, but so is 
an adequate choice of methodology, which greatly infl uences the material on the 
basis of which theories can be crafted. Our contribution to the debate, therefore, 
is to highlight how ethnographic fi eldwork offers an understanding of the ways 
in which context is decisive. In our view, this insight counteracts any dream of a 
universal theory of clientelism.
We consider that it is the ethnographic approach that has allowed us to dis-
cover how the communitarian lifeworld and networking practices prepare the 
ground for the legitimate operation of problem-solving clientelist networks. The 
failure of the state to reach out to citizens is also part of this context. We think 
that this understanding in itself is valuable, even if it is not generalizable. How-
ever, considering that we have studied two communities, fi nding a lot of common 
ground, it might be worthwhile in future studies to consider the possibility that 
other communities with Mesoamerican roots might exhibit similar traits. Maybe 
we are on the track of a community adaptation to political clientelism.
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